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Abstract

In recent years, liberal arts education has faced caustic
challenges on the grounds that it is neither a wise investment nor relevant
in the modern era. However, these claims disregard the contention
that liberal arts education has an intrinsic value that supersedes other
tertiary concerns. The benefits of a liberal arts education are certainly
comprehensive and apply to all members of society. As such, the inherent
merit of the liberal arts must be recognized and supported by the state at
all educational levels. The current economic and political environment
has made it apparent that anything less will severely undermine the
solemn standing of the liberal arts. If we are to repudiate the liberal arts,
we will deny the very essence of what makes us human.

Introduction
As I write this, some American universities are severely scaling back
or even closing humanities departments like Classical Studies and Romance
Languages. In the U.K., funding for higher education in the humanities has
been drastically cut (Morgan). Some of the logic behind these cuts lies in the
idea that the humanities are a luxury good that cannot be afforded in difficult
economic times, and that in an increasingly competitive and global economy,
countries are better served by focusing on disciplines related to science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics. Meanwhile, some “Occupy”
protesters in different cities have decried a system that led them to take on
thousands of dollars in student loans in pursuit of degrees that have not been
well-received by potential employers. On the other side of this debate, Rush
Limbaugh has blamed universities, saying that they “offer useless majors,
and then they lie about the quality of these useless majors. They lie about the
happiness and the jobs and the money that awaits you after you get a degree
in something like Classical Studies.” The one thing these widely varying
views share is that they all approach the idea of liberal arts education as
something to be debated in terms of its pure economic value.
I will argue that liberal arts education has an inherent value that
transcends economic and political conditions. The liberal arts are good for
our soul, our view of the world, and our innate creativity. In light of difficult
funding decisions that educational institutions face, this inherent value must
be recognized to ensure the continued survival of the liberal arts. While the
liberal arts can be defended in terms of their benefits for national prosperity
Volume 8 | Spring 2013

129

The Value of a Liberal Arts Education
and good democratic citizens, this view stops short by giving liberal arts
education an instrumental rather than an inherent value. My argument is
not based on a paternalistic view, and I will seek to defend it against the
possible objection that claiming an inherent value for liberal arts violates
liberal neutrality. Given this inherent value, I will argue that states should
not debate the stages or types of education which should include liberal arts
components, but should seek to ensure an emphasis on the liberal arts at all
levels of education. I believe that while the debate around the liberal arts
often focuses on their place in higher education, it is critical to support their
place in elementary education as well. The inherent benefits that I argue for
apply for all people in society.
Defining “Liberal Arts”
In order to take a side in the debate about the value of a liberal arts
education, it is necessary to provide a definition of a liberal arts education. In
fact, this very exercise may calm the doubts of some skeptics before my larger
argument for the inherent value of a liberal arts education. It would seem
that sometimes those who decry the supposed uselessness of the liberal arts
might hold misconceptions about what they so vehemently argue against.
I will use a definition eloquently argued for by Matthew Arnold
in the late nineteenth century. Arnold was the two-time Chair of Poetry
at Oxford and for much of his career the Inspector of Schools in England.
Arnold says that the humanities are often criticized on the grounds that “the
study is an elegant one, but slight and ineffectual; a smattering of Greek and
Latin and other ornamental things, or little use for any one whose object is
to get at truth and be a practical man” (246). He says that there is “always a
tendency in those who are remonstrating against the predominance of letters
in education to understand by letters belles lettres and by belles lettres a
superficial humanism, the opposite of science or true knowledge” (246). He
then goes on to clarify what he means by an education of letters, or rather a
liberal arts education, by discussing the example of an education in Greek
and Roman Antiquity, which in his time and ours is placed firmly in the
realm of liberal arts disciplines. When Arnold speaks of knowing Greek and
Roman antiquity as an aid for knowing ourselves and the world, he means
“more than a knowledge of so much vocabulary, so much grammar, so many
portions of authors in the Greek and Latin languages- [he means] knowing
the Greeks and Romans, and their life and genius, and what they were and
did in the world; what we get form them and what is its value” (246). This
description, rather than characterizing a superficial sort of knowledge, is
in fact consistent with the type of education that would allow people to
understand greater truths.
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Arnold goes on to say that the type of education he advocates for
involves “knowing the best which has been thought and uttered in the world”
(247). Arnold says that by speaking of “knowing ancient Rome,” he does
not mean “knowing merely more or less of Latin belles lettres and taking
no account of Rome’s military and political and legal and administrative
work in the world.” By knowing ancient Greece, he means “knowing her
as the giver of Greek art and the guide to a free and right use of reason
and to scientific method, and the founder of our mathematics and physics
and astronomy and biology” and “knowing her as all this and not merely
knowing certain Greek poems and histories and treatises and speeches- so as
to the knowledge of the modern nations also” (247). Essentially, he describes
what a modern liberal arts university would include under the heading of a
Classical Studies degree. Such a course of study does not focus on literary
texts at the exclusion of historical context, archaeological knowledge, and
philosophical background. I will choose to adhere to this definition during
my argument. A liberal arts education brings its pupils a uniquely rich depth
and breadth of knowledge, and in the latter sections of this paper I will
examine the inherent values of these virtues for the students.
The State’s Role in Education
In order to provide support for the idea that the state should have
a role in supporting certain types of education, it is important to examine
philosophical views towards education, particularly when viewed through
the lens of equality of opportunity. John Rawls, a leading twentieth century
political philosopher, discusses the importance of equality of opportunity
in ensuring a just society in his influential work A Theory of Justice. Rawls
says “those who are at the same level of talent and ability and have the
same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of success
regardless of their initial place in the social system, that is, irrespective of
the income class into which they were born” (63). Following from Rawls’s
idea, it seems clear that if a democratic state wants to ensure people this
freedom, the state should take a significant amount of responsibility for
education, which provides a pathway to later success in life. If people of
all income levels have equality of opportunity in education, this would give
them the chance to transcend the social circumstances into which they are
born. Unfortunately, many people live in circumstances that place barriers in
the way of their social mobility and access to education. If certain groups of
people are systematically excluded from having access to education, this will
exclude these groups from the possibility of social mobility, since education
provides an avenue to later opportunities in life.
When people suffer from a cumulative disadvantage caused by
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inadequate access to education, they will be severely restricted in their
freedom to pursue the kind of life they want (in terms of careers, leisure
activities, etc.). In accordance with Rawls’s principles of justice, the state
should seek to ensure educational access for its citizens. When people have
inadequate access to education, it will be impossible to fulfill part of Rawls’s
second principle: positions and offices will not truly be open to all based on
fair equality of opportunity because many people will lack the education to
be eligible for such offices and positions.
In an opposing view, Nozick would claim that education does not
fall within the realm of services the minimal state should provide, nor would
he think that it is the role of the state to rectify inequalities that may arise from
a lack of educational opportunities. I do not propose to examine Nozick’s
idea of just acquisitions in terms of economic resources and whether or not
they should be redistributed to ensure a just society, but his transactional
principles do not seem completely compatible with a social good such as
education. His work particularly opposed taxation, saying that it is “on a
par with forced labor” (169). Since taxation is the means by which a large
portion of public education is supported, it would seem that Nozick’s model
does not allow for a state role in education. However, as Scanlon points out,
in Nozick’s model “citizens may band together for whatever other purposes
they may desire-to provide education, to aid the needy, to organize social
insurance schemes-but such schemes must be purely voluntary, and the state
must enforce any-one’s right not to be compelled to contribute to them” (1).
Despite this possibility that groups of people within the minimal
state could support education, leaving the choice open this way could have
dire consequences. If people in the upper class banded together to support
education, but only for their own children, citizens in the lower classes might
not be able or encouraged to participate in this system. Since there is no
redistributive mechanism to ensure that, for example, a revenue stream like
property taxes could be used to fund public education, it seems probable
that there would be an entire class of people who would not be ensured
access to education. Education would become the privilege of the wealthy
as opposed to the right of all citizens. In this situation, social stratification
would increase, and there would be an entire class of relatively uninformed
political participants (those without education), and this would lead to
disenfranchisement. The class of people who did not have access to education
would, in addition to missing out on the instrumental values of a liberal arts
education, be deprived of the inherent values I argue for as well.
Citizenship Education
This basis for state support of education does not in itself clarify
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what types of education should be supported. Education is often discussed
in terms of its utility for creating good democratic citizens, an idea which
appears in Rawls’s work Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Rawls describes
how citizenship education will be accomplished in a society, saying that
“citizens acquire an understanding of the public political culture and its
traditions of interpreting basic constitutional values” (145). According
to Rawls, this is accomplished through judicial processes, such as the
interpretation of constitutional cases and how these are affirmed by political
parties. He says that “if disputed judicial decisions-there are bound to be
such-call forth deliberative political discussion in the course of which their
merits are reasonably debated in terms of constitutional principles, then even
these disputed decisions, by drawing citizens into public debate, may serve a
vital educational role” (146). Essentially, Rawls thinks that the political and
judicial process themselves will be the primary tools through which citizens
receive democratic education, and additional formal education in this area
will not be required.
It seems unlikely that in all cases citizenship education will be
ensured solely through participation in the political process, especially
given that this idea depends on active efforts on the part of the citizens to
participate in this level of deliberative processing. With the voter turnout
rate in the U.S. hovering slightly above 60%, it seems unlikely that public
debate will serve its intended educational role (McDonald). Additionally,
even in their strongest formulation, his ideas have instrumental overtones.
They are focused on citizenship education and the overall goal of allowing
people to have equal opportunities to succeed, which is framed in careerbased terms.
According to Costa, Rawls’s neglect of this topic can be partly
explained by “his confidence that the functioning of just institutions will
‘spontaneously’ generate, in citizens who live under them, the necessary
support for principles of justice, and will encourage the development and
exercise of the virtues characteristic of reasonable citizens” (56). When
closely examined, this argument seems to have a circular structure. If citizens
are necessary to contribute to a strong public political culture, but these
same citizens derive their reasonable and virtuous nature from the political
institutions they live under, then there would seem to be a basic component
missing from democratic societies if the citizens do not have some basic
access to democratic education. Participation in the democratic process is
necessary, but it is by no means the same thing as formal education that
fosters qualities necessary for democratic citizenship.
A report by the Carnegie Foundation called “Educating for Democracy:
Preparing Undergraduates for Responsible Political Engagement” highlights
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this shortfall. The report states “in a 2006 survey of California high school
graduates who had recently completed a course in U.S. government, half
could not correctly identify the function of the Supreme Court, a third could
not name either of California’s two U.S. senators, and 41 percent did not
know whether the Republican or Democratic party is more conservative. For
the sake of these individuals and for the health of our democracy, it is critical
to strengthen their understanding of political institutions, issues and events”
(3). The report goes on to recommend that this could be accomplished at the
university level, because “more than 15 million Americans from increasingly
diverse backgrounds are enrolled as undergraduates in our nation’s colleges
and universities” and “when undergraduates have the understanding and
skills to be politically engaged, many are motivated to do so. Research suggests
that colleges are well positioned to promote democratic competencies and
participation, and to prepare students to be thoughtful, responsible, creative
citizens” (3).
Another work that discusses education’s effects on democratic
skills is Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom. Friedman believes
that positive effects for the state will occur as a result of funding for higher
education because it is “a means of training youngsters for citizenship and for
community leadership,” and that subsidies should be provided for this type
of education to individuals to spend at institutions of their choosing, which
would “make for more effective competition among various types of schools
and for a more efficient utilization of their resources” (99). He also discusses
education at more basic levels, saying that “a stable and democratic society is
impossible without a minimum degree of literacy and knowledge on the part
of most citizens and without widespread acceptance of some set of values.
Education can contribute to both.” Thus, he continues, “the gain from the
education of a child accrues not only to the child or his parents but also to
other members of the society” (86). This argument, although it does not rely
solely on the benefit of education to economic prosperity but incorporates
the benefits to democratic citizenship, is nonetheless highly instrumental.
The value of liberal arts education lies in the benefit to the community, partly
in the form of the stability in society that democratic education supposedly
carries.
He goes on to state that “the qualitative argument from ‘neighborhood
effects’ does not, of course, determine the specific kinds of schooling that
should be subsidized or by how much they should be subsidized. The social
gain presumably is greatest for the lowest levels of schooling, where there is
the nearest approach to unanimity about content, and declines continuously
as the level of schooling rises” (88). This essentially quantifies the marginal
benefits of education. This approach would provide support for some form
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of basic education for all, but by no means guarantees any access to higher
education or a specific type of education unless it provides increasing
marginal utility to the community.
Although his approach acknowledges that education is valuable for
economic and political reasons, I think this framework would place some
members of society at a severe disadvantage. Friedman states that “what
forms of education have the greatest social advantage and how much of the
community’s limited resources should be spent on them must be decided by
the judgment of the community expressed through its acceptable political
challenges” (89). Thus, if through the deliberative process it is decided that
only basic literacy and mathematics education are necessary for the majority
of the population, this framework would lead to a failure of equality.
Quantifying education in terms of “greatest social advantage” deals with
an idea of marginal benefit to individual people, and distributing education
in a way that creates the greatest advantage would likely mean giving
educational resources to people who are the most academically gifted. This
instrumental view will exclude the less-advantaged members of a society.
If the state chooses to support only basic education for the majority of the
population, then many of the liberal arts disciplines will only be accessible to
people who society deems the mostly likely to benefit from their study. The
inherent values that I believe a liberal arts education provides are not limited
to the most intelligent or economically advantaged members in a society,
and thus Friedman’s practical conclusions fall short of my ideal view of the
grounds for supporting liberal arts education.
Amy Gutmann’s work also articulates the qualities and benefits of
education that can enhance democratic participation. Her views include the
usefulness of education in forming moral character, which comes closer to
the inherent values I will argue for, but still stops short by framing the value
in instrumental terms. Gutmann cites Noah Webster’s idea that “education,
in great measure, forms the moral character of men, and morals are the basis
of government.” However, Webster goes on to say that “the only practicable
method to reform mankind is to begin with children, to banish, if possible,
from their company every low-bred, drunken, immoral character” (48-9). By
acknowledging that in a democratic society, citizens “must be free to disagree
over what constitutes low-bred and immoral character” (48), Gutmann
adapts this into a more realistic and timely framework. Her version is that:
“Education, in a great measure, forms the moral character of citizens,
and moral character along with laws and institutions, forms the basis
of democratic government. Democratic government, in turn, shapes the
education of future citizens, which, in a great measure, forms their moral
character. Because democracies must rely on the moral character of parents,
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teachers, public officials, and ordinary citizens to education future citizens,
democratic education begins not only with children who are to be taught but
also with citizens who are to be their teachers” (48).
This idea of complete participation in democratic education to ensure
participation in democracy emphasizes the need for this type of education
throughout society.
Gutmann’s description of this type of education makes it clear that
it is consistent with that found in the liberal arts disciplines. Education
that teaches democratic virtue is that which teaches people “the ability to
deliberate, and hence to participate in conscious social reproduction” (46).
She states that there are two basic facts about our lives, which are that “we
disagree about what is good” and “we face hard choices as individuals even
when we agree as a group.” These two facts “are the basis for an argument
that primary education should be both exemplary and didactic. Children
must learn not just how to behave in accordance with authority but to think
critically about how they are to live up to the democratic idea of sharing
political sovereignty as citizens” (51). I believe that the deliberative skills and
critical thinking necessary for these ideals can be found in the liberal arts
disciplines. However, even valuing education for its benefits in a democratic
society stops short of acknowledging the true worth of the humanities.
Inherent Value
In my freshman year Greek history class, the professor titled his first
lecture “Why history matters.” On one of the lecture slides he juxtaposed
a picture of the famous kore, a statue of a Greek woman that resides in the
Acropolis museum, with a picture of Brittney Spears. He posited that all
learning is an antidote to popular culture. In our society, there is a profound
importance to being able to recognize something that speaks to us more
deeply that the drama on the latest episode of a reality T.V. show or the
scandal over the latest celebrity divorce. I will argue that the inherent value
of the humanities lies within this deeper and more profound sphere. The
liberal arts have an inherent value for our souls, the way we view the world
around us, and our innate creativity.
In Plato’s Republic, Socrates provides an argument for the idea that
education is good for our souls. The Socratic method of learning to recognize
the good can be understood through the allegory of the cave, in which the
prisoners in the cave gradually learn to recognize that the shapes they see are
mere shadows, and eventually leave the cave to live in the light of the sun
and recognize the highest form of good. However, after they have made this
ascent, people “must be willing to go down again among those prisoners”
to “share their labors and honors, whether they be slighter or more serious”
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(519d). A Socratic method of learning is one that engages students actively
in their own learning by guiding them towards lessons and truths while
allowing them to ask questions and critically engage with the topics. Socrates’
discussion of education indicates that the power of knowledge “is in the soul
of each and that the instrument with which each learns--just as an eye is not
able to turn toward the light from the dark without the whole body--must be
turned around from that which is coming into being together with the whole
soul until it is able to endure looking at that which is and the brightest part
of that which is” (518c). This view emphasizes the fact that education is not
just about giving someone a simple skill or a tool with which to accomplish
certain tasks, but rather it is a holistic process that involves re-shaping the
very soul of a person. I believe that this type of learning, one that engages
people at the level of their very soul, is found within the liberal arts.
Another work that supports my argument for the inherent value
of education is Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. He discusses education
as a way to avoid the dehumanization that he views as a consequence
of capitalism. He says that “in the progress of the division of labour, the
employment of the far greater part of those who live by labour, that is, of
the great body of the people, comes to be confirmed to a few very simple
operations, frequently to one or two” (839). He describes the consequences
of this, for as he argues, “the man whose whole life is spent in performing
a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the
same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding, or
to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties
which will never occur.” Such a man will in due course lose “the habit of
such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible
for a human creature to become” (839-40). When this occurs, “the torpor of
his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in
any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender
sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many
even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extensive interests
of his country he is altogether incapable of judging” (840). Basic education
is presented as a way to avoid this downward spiral. Thus, peoples’ access
to education allows them to connect with their humanity and become better
citizens by understanding the larger interests of their country. The initial part
of his argument approaches the point I will focus on because it deals with
the qualities of human beings that exist outside of political and economic
models. I think that the ability to conceive of the “generous, noble, or tender
sentiment[s]” that Smith discusses presents a strong argument for the ways
in which education can enrich our souls.
Martha Nussbaum provides a modern argument for the idea
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that humanities education holds inherent value in addition to its role in
promoting good democratic citizenship. She says that “when we meet in
society, if we have not learned to see both the self and other in that way,
imagining in one another inner faculties of thought and emotion, democracy
is bound to fail, because democracy is built upon respect and concern, and
these in turn are built upon the ability to see other people as human beings,
not simply as objects” (6). This ability, while essential for democratic citizens,
also has inherent value by virtue of strengthening peoples’ sense of their
own humanity and enforcing the recognition of humanity in others.
Nussbaum argues that the humanities have an inherent value
because they are good for our souls, and if we lose liberal arts education, we
will forget our soul. She acknowledges that for many people this word has
strong religious connotations, but she connects her arguments to Tagore’s
and Alcott’s meanings and defines the soul as: “the faculties of thought and
imagination that make us human and make our relationships rich human
relationships, rather than relationships of mere use and manipulation” (6).
One can find an echo of Smith’s idea that the humanities are necessary to
prevent dehumanization: although society is not as stratified as it was in
Smith’s time and not all of the working class are employed in jobs where
they perform the same one or two tasks over and over again, we still run the
risk of losing an integral part of ourselves if we neglect liberal arts education.
Nussbaum references the work of British pediatrician and
psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott and his research on the developmental
role that imaginative play has for children. She says that “as play develops,
the child develops a capacity for wonder. Simple nursery rhymes already
urge children to put themselves in the place of a small animal, another child,
even an inanimate object” (96). The example she gives is the nursery rhyme
“twinkle twinkle little star, how I wonder what you are.” She describes it as
“a paradigm of wonder, since it involves looking at a shape and endowing
that shape with an inner world. This is what children ultimately must
be able to do with other people. Nursery rhymes and stories are thus a
crucial preparation for concern in life” (97). Describing nursery rhymes as
preparation for later intellectual and interpersonal connections in life might
seem to tilt this argument towards the instrumental as well, yet the sense
of wonder and imagination that is described in child’s play is ethereal and
essentially impossible to quantify. I will choose to focus on the existence of
the rhyme and the feeling itself as two sides of the same coin. Such natural
wonder and curiosity are key components of the human condition, and
any manifestation of these qualities should be seen as a manifestation of
humanity itself.
Nussbaum says that as people get older, they can “close up, forgetting
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the inner world of others, or they can retain and further develop the capacity
to endow the forms of others, in imagination, with inner life” (98). In the first
scenario, people are denying a part of what makes us human, while in the
second they are enriching their very souls. In my view, if people are engaged
in the liberal arts from an early point in their education and continue this
engagement throughout their lives, they can continuously enrich their souls
and their identity as human beings. Nussbaum says that “it is all too easy to
see another person as just a body-which we might then think we can use for
our own ends, bad or good” and “it is an achievement to see a soul in that
body, and this achievement is supported by poetry and the arts, which as us
to wonder about the inner world of that shape we see- and, too, to wonder
about ourselves and our own depths.” Thus, the liberal arts encapsulate
the manifestation of humanity that imaginative play and nursery rhymes
represent for small children. Failing to acknowledge this leads to the closing
off that Nussbaum describes and the loss of our inner world.
I will now turn to the ways in which a liberal arts education has
value for how we view the world around us. Mike Seymour states that
the purpose of his work, Education for Humanity, is to make the case for
“creating schools that are devoted to all dimensions of the human condition”
in which “all students will be engaged collaboratively to succeed by a caring
educational community” (ix). He says that the insight he argues for in his
book is that “the separation of people from their deeper selves underlies
all other forms of disconnection. Being disconnected from oneself hampers
true connection to others, to the natural world, and to a higher meaning that
gives a sense of hope and fulfillment” (11). The study of the humanities deals
extensively with the study of the human condition. I believe that supporting
the type of education he argues for will allow people to better connect to
their true selves, and by extension form stronger connections to others and
the world around them. Seymour says that “educating for self begins the
journey to realize inner aliveness and purpose by finding ourselves through
what we cherish and love” (33). Like the prisoners in Socrates’ allegory of the
cave, I think that all people are searching for the form of the good, and they
will be unable to achieve it without the study of the liberal arts.
Arguing for the inherent value of the liberal arts by grounding it
in the ethereal area of its good for the soul can be a difficult endeavor. For
example, Mark Roche, a former dean of Notre Dame’s College of Arts and
Letters, points out that “when the value of a liberal arts education is defended
today, educators normally elevate not its intrinsic value, which is simply
too foreign to contemporary culture, but critical thinking, which is essential
to success and crucial to the venerable enlightenment goal of dismantling
false truths” (101). Yet the complexity of providing an inherent defense for
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the liberal arts has not kept Roche and other authors from delving into this
area. Indeed, I would be doing my own liberal arts background a disservice
if I shied away from this area simply because it represents a more abstract
argument. Defending the liberal arts for their inherent value is the only way
to ensure their place in society regardless of the economic or political climate
of a state.
The study of the liberal arts, in addition to being good for our souls,
is beneficial for the way that we see and understand the world around us.
Roche’s argument includes the inherent good of the liberal arts both in an
internal and external sense. Roche states that while a liberal arts education
can “help us discover intrinsic goods, it is in itself an intrinsic good” (15).
Thus, if a liberal arts education is not supported by a state, we lose an entire
bundle of intrinsic goods: the inherent good represented by a liberal arts
education itself and the other goods it guarantees. He goes on to say that a
liberal arts education helps “students recognize the gap between the world
as it is and the world as it ought to be while at the same time reconciling them
to what is good and beautiful about the world they have inherited” (20).
In recognizing this difference between the possible and the actual, students
are engaged at a higher level of humanity and are able to ask broad-based
questions about how and why things have come to be the way they are and
whether and how to change them. Although this is a more complex question
than a child wondering what a star is, it is nonetheless a question based on
imagination and the ability to construct a better world in our minds and even
attempt to help that world come to exist in reality.
Roche gives specific examples of how different areas in the liberal
arts serve to elevate the way in which we view the world around us. He
says that “art assists the individual’s search for edification and contributes
to the collective identity of a culture” and “offers a window not only into the
collective identity of a given culture but also into the complexity and dignity
of humankind and indeed onto the transcendent itself” (20). Additionally,
“our experience of art and literature differs from the routine experience of
consumption and utility. When we appreciate an object of beauty, we do not
desire to possess or transform it, to consume or use it; we leave it free as it
is. Our experience of literature is of value for its own sake. It is ‘purposeless’
in the higher sense of being its own end” (35). This relates closely to
Nussbaum’s discussion of the importance of maintaining a sense of wonder.
Thus, the form of education that helps us learn how to appreciate things like
art and literature as ends in themselves is in itself an intrinsic good. I believe
that students who have had access to a liberal arts education will be better
able to critically engage with the world around them and appreciate art and
literature on a deeper level.
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Victor Ferrall concurs with Roche that a liberal arts education is
valuable for individuals and for the relationships that people form with one
another. He says that a “society needs well and broadly educated citizens.
The more liberally educated citizens it has, the stronger it will be. Individuals
benefit from being well and broadly educated. The more they are liberally
educated, the stronger they will be in both their personal and professional
lives, and as citizens” (16). Liberal arts strengthen a society by improving the
way in which people relate to one another, and this is accomplished by virtue
of the fact that they strengthen its citizens as individuals. Although a stronger
democratic society is certainly a worthy achievement, the argument need
not progress that far: the liberal arts are good for individuals in a society by
virtue of the fact that they have inherent good for the relationships between
individuals regardless of their place in society or the type of society in which
they live.
I will now examine the ways in which the liberal arts are valuable for
our innate creativity. An argument for this can be found in the work of Ferrall
and Roche in their discussions of how the humanities help people relate
different areas of knowledge and demarcate their place in the world around
them. In doing so, people are able to envision possibilities beyond their daily
experiences and think more creatively. Roche says that “liberal arts students
are encouraged to develop not only an awareness of knowledge intrinsic to
their major but a recognition of that discipline’s position within the larger
mosaic of knowledge” (20). Ferrall states that “a liberal education defines the
relationship of its holders to the world around them” and that people who
pursue such an education “are seldom satisfied with their level of knowing.
They wonder, and bring their analytical resources and knowledge to bear
on their wondering. The life of their minds is not limited by or to their daily
experience. For them, the fact of not knowing can be a source of pleasurable
challenge. Creativity is central to what they value” (17).
This creativity can be viewed as an effect of the different ways of
understanding the world that the liberal arts inspires, but I believe that the
two still represent separate inherent goods. I would posit that one can lead
to the other in a cycle of innovation and appreciation for inner beauty. People
who are inspired by a deep appreciation for art or literature may go on to
create their own works of art, which can in turn be appreciated for others
for the sake of their beauty. By allowing the “life of the mind” to transcend
mere everyday experience, the liberal arts prevent us from experiencing the
dehumanization against which Smith cautioned.
In an era where the liberal arts are challenged both in higher
education and grade school curricula, it is important to prove to the skeptics
that there is an inherent value to the liberal arts. However, there is yet
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another approach to the defense of the liberal arts, and it lies in what comes
down to an eloquent version of pleading the Fifth. Stanley Fish says that,
“To the question ‘of what use are the humanities?,’ the only honest answer
is none whatsoever. And it is an answer that brings honor to its subject.
Justification, after all, confers value on an activity from a perspective outside
its performance. An activity that cannot be justified is an activity that refuses
to regard itself as instrumental to some larger good. The humanities are their
own good.” Fish goes on to say that in some ways he knows he is asking the
world “to subsidize [his] moments of aesthetic wonderment” when he sees
a beautiful piece of art or reads a moving poem. At first glance this might
sound self-centered, but upon closer examination, it can be completely
egalitarian. After all, why should everyone not experience this same sense
of wonder when seeing a painting or reading a passage of literature that
speaks to them? Supporting the idea that the liberal arts have an inherent
value is not a matter of subsidizing one person’s tastes, but rather involves
recognizing something integral to our humanity. Far from being a useless
luxury good, the humanities are essential to our identities as humans.
Objections to the Inherent Value
If the state acknowledges liberal arts education and supports its
inherent value, this could this be seen by some as a value judgment of one type
of education over another. I am not arguing that all people must be required
to pursue a liberal arts degree in college, but rather that the liberal arts
must be ensured a permanent place in society and at all levels of education.
However, it could be argued that this view violates liberal neutrality. After
all, who am I to say that Greek statues are inherently superior to Britney
Spears?
Some might respond to the view that Fish espoused in the last section
by arguing that they have no obligation to subsidize other peoples’ enjoyment
of the arts, or education that focuses on subjects like art and literature, if
they do not enjoy such things. Bentham and Mill also debated the issue of
whether all pleasures are equal. Bentham takes a utilitarian point of view in
qualifying different types of enjoyment, while Mill takes a perfectionist view
that some types of pleasures are superior to others. I will use their arguments
to support the idea that regardless of whether all pleasures are weighted
equally, a range of options must be allowed to exist in order to give people
the opportunity to choose the types of pleasures that bring them the most
fulfillments.
Bentham’s equivalent example of the Greek statue and Britney Spears
was the comparison between reading poetry and the game of push-pin. He
said that, “prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the
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arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnished
more pleasure, it is more valuable than either. Everybody can play push-pin:
poetry and music are relished only by a few” (93). In fact, he goes on to say
that the preference of poetry to push-pin could even be conceived as elitist,
because “if poetry and music deserve to be [sic] preferred before a game of
push-pin, it must be because they are calculated to gratify those individuals
who are most difficult to be pleased” (94). I acknowledge that it is entirely
possible that someone could gain equal or even greater enjoyment from pushpin over poetry, as they could gain equal or even greater enjoyment from
Britney Spears over Greek statues. However, while games and pop music
may be more accessible or more appealing for some, they do not require
any additional support in the way that poetry and art do. Market forces will
not always be kind to the arts, and I believe that a societal commitment to
the liberal arts is necessary to ensure that people have the opportunity to
appreciate things like poetry, art, and classical music.
While Mill takes the perfectionist view that some pleasures are
inherently superior to others, I believe that his argument can also be used
to illustrate the necessity of ensuring that the higher pleasures are available
to all in society. Mill states it was “quite compatible with the principle of
utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasures are more desirable
and valuable than others. It would be absurd that, while in estimating all
other things quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of
pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone” (Mill 8). In order
to make this qualitative distinction, he said that “of two pleasures, if there
be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided
preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that
is the more desirable pleasure” (8). Thus, he argues that people who do not
appreciate higher pleasures have simply not had the chance to enjoy them
and are not making a fully informed choice. Mill describes higher pleasures
as ones that engage our uniquely human capacities, and says that “those
who are equally acquainted with and equally capable of appreciating and
enjoying both do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence
which employs their higher faculties” (9). Mill states that “it is better to be a
human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied
than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is
because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the
comparison knows both sides” (10). This statement does seem elitist: after
all, people who enjoy the occasional reality T.V. show or pop culture tabloid
story would probably not be happy to be told that they are merely fools
whose satisfaction comes from a lack of full information about their options.
Mill has a response for this concern, although this part of his argument
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continues to emphasize the superiority of the higher pleasures over the
lower pleasures. He says that many people who are capable of appreciating
higher pleasures will sometimes forgo them for lower pleasures. He says that
“this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority
of the lower. Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for
the nearer good, thought they know it to be the less valuable; and this is no
less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures than when it is between
bodily and mental” (10). Citing insecurity of character for the choice of lower
pleasures might create new objections instead of calming all concerns, but
the idea that people must have an opportunity to cultivate an appreciation
for higher pleasures in order to enjoy them is a more defensible position.
I would like to add a further stipulation to Mill’s view. Even in
saying that people sometimes choose lower pleasures over higher pleasures,
his argument conforms to a perfectionist view. According to Mill, the
higher pleasures are inherently superior and all people, if given sufficient
opportunity to experience them, will recognize this fact. I would argue
that if the state does not support the liberal arts, then they are essentially
giving preference to types of learning and pleasure that tend to be marketdriven. Things like pop music and reality T.V. will continue to exist due to
the fact that many people enjoy them, and thus there will always be money
to be made in presenting such material to the public. However, if there is
an insufficient emphasis on the liberal arts, many people will not have the
opportunity to appreciate the things that Mill would categorize as higher
pleasures. If people have few opportunities to learn about things like art and
classical music, they might not seek out things like museums and orchestra
concerts as leisure activities, and the existence of these cultural institutions
will be jeopardized. Thus, ensuring an emphasis on the liberal arts and
peoples’ ability to appreciate certain pursuits does not entail acknowledging
their superiority, but rather making sure that they continue to exist as options
in society.
There is yet another modern objection that state support for a certain
type of education could be construed as undue preference. This is a part
of the idea of liberal neutrality argued for by Ronal Dworkin in his work
A Matter of Principle. Dworkin states that “government must be neutral
on what might be called the question of the good life” (191). This theory
“supposes that political decisions must be, so far as is possible, independent
of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life.
Since the citizens of a society differ in their conceptions, the government
does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another” (191).
According to this view, a government would seem to violate liberal neutrality
if it supported the liberal arts when some citizens in a society might not hold
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this as part of their conception of a good life. Following from this, I see two
logical directions for the argument to take: either all citizens in a society must
unanimously agree that the inherent value of the liberal arts is applicable
regardless of what peoples’ conception of a good life is (which I think is ideal,
but unlikely), or the strict nature of liberal neutrality must be examined.
In fact, there are several existing criticisms of liberal neutrality. Colin
Macleod argues that adoption of neutrality might be inconsistent with other
important liberal commitments. He states that much of the “state activity that
liberals have traditionally endorsed is difficult to reconcile with neutrality.
Specifically, it seems difficult to justify government policies and programs
which aim at preserving and enriching the artistic and cultural character
of communities without appeal to perfectionist considerations of the sort
forbidden by neutrality” (530-531). Given the extent to which many modern
democracies engage in activities that are inconsistent with liberal neutrality
already, I think it would be entirely justified to add the defense of the liberal
arts to this category. However, an even more defensible approach would be
to provide a different definition for the type of neutrality that states should
seek.
Richard Arneson provides one such definition in his work “Liberal
Neutrality on the Good: An Autopsy.” He states that one possible conception
of neutrality is neutrality of justification, which “requires that any policies
pursued by the state should be justified independently of any appeal
to the supposed superiority of any way of life or conception of the good
over others” (193). I will choose to adhere to this definition. Although the
appreciation of art and literature might not be a key component in everyone’s
conception of the good life, I think that the existence of the liberal arts is
justified independently of this fact. As I argued earlier, economically-driven
entertainment will always have a place in society due to market forces, but
if we do not support the liberal arts their existence will be jeopardized. As
I will discuss in the following section, viewing the liberal arts in marketbased terms can lead to their marginalization. The state must acknowledge
the inherent value of the liberal arts in order to secure their place in society
and ensure that people have the opportunity to enrich their souls, broaden
their view of the world around them, and nurture their own creativity.
Importance of the Inherent Value
In many of the authors I have discussed it is possible to find
arguments for the economic good of the humanities and their utility
in creating democratic citizens. For example, Nussbaum’s argument
incorporates the portion of debate around liberal arts education that centers
on whether education that is not linked to economic profitability should be
Volume 8 | Spring 2013

145

The Value of a Liberal Arts Education
considered necessary. She states that “the national interest of any modern
democracy requires a strong economy and a flourishing business culture”
and that this economic interest “requires us to draw on the humanities and
arts, in order to promote a climate of responsible and watchful stewardship
and a culture of creative innovation.” Although I agree with this, I think this
argument stops short of the true worth of the liberal arts by assigning them
an instrumental value in terms of their good for the economic and political
interests of a democracy. Following from this connection, her argument
reframes the debate as she states that “we are not forced to choose between
a form of education that promotes profit and a form of education that
promotes good citizenship” (10-11). Nussbaum states that “science, rightly
pursued, is a friend of the humanities rather than their enemy” (7). However,
the funding pressures have placed different types of education in direct
competition with one another, which sets up a system of winners and losers
rather than a coexistence of different types of education. I believe the current
economic and political climate make it clear why an inherent view of the
value of liberal arts is necessary.
Arguments that focus on education solely as a means to economic
growth place the humanities in a fragile position. In “Economic Value of
Education and Cognitive Skills, Eric Hanshuk says that, “In the United
States, the rapidly increasing earnings of college-educated workers during
the past two decades currently provides them with a premium of more than
70% higher earnings than a high school graduate with similar job experience”
(40). He goes on to explain that these benefits apply on the national level as
well, and that “recent studies suggest that education is important both as an
investment in human capital and in facilitating research and development
and the diffusion of technologies (see Benhabib & Spiegel, 2005)” (41). If
philosophy or English majors are not be seen as facilitating “research and
development” or the “diffusion of technologies,” then this view seems to
leave little room for their national value.
Politicians often discuss the usefulness of education solely in
terms of career preparation and job creation. In my home state of Florida,
politicians have recently questioned the merit of using taxpayer dollars to
support degrees they view as less than useful. In October, Governor Rick
Scott said in an interview to The Herald-Tribune that he wants to shift money
away from some degree programs at state universities to increase support for
science and technology fields. He explains his reasons for cutting humanities
funding as follows: “If I’m going to take money from a citizen to put into
education then I’m going to take that money to create jobs. So I want that
money to go to degrees where people can get jobs in this state. Is it a vital
interest of the state to have more anthropologists? I don’t think so.” This
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simple and shortsighted view values education solely in terms of resulting
economic gains and places the liberal arts in direct competition with the
“STEM” subjects. In the current economic climate, it is even more tempting
to discuss education in terms of how it can benefit economic growth, and in
this case liberal arts education may seem expendable.
The view espoused by Rick Scott is far from a radical one. In a report
by the National Governor’s Association Center for Best Practices, it is stated
that if “higher education is truly going to help drive economic growth,
students’ academic success must be tied to the needs of the marketplace—
not only to ensure that students get jobs, but also to maximize the value of
an educated workforce to the economy as a whole” (5). The report says that
governors and state policy makers must ask themselves the question: “Are
we producing degrees that provide the greatest chance of yielding the most
benefit—for individuals, industry, and the state economy?” (5). In an odd
turn of language that hints that perhaps the authors do not remember the
classic quote from Animal Farm that says “all animals are equal, but some
animals are more equal than others,” the report states that “more degrees are
important…but some degrees are more valuable than others” (11). It goes on
to say that “a degree is better than no degree, but degrees that do not fit the
job market and raise the standard of living will not lift the economy” (11).
This places higher education firmly in the context of how much utility it can
directly produce for the economy.
As David Carr points out, “if the key purpose of the modern
university is the higher pursuit of truth then history may have greater claim
on curricular programming and resources than technical engineering: but if
the key goal is utility, then poetry will fare poorly in any competition with
business studies” (8). In the current economic climate, many universities are
faced with cuts, and these cuts frequently take place in the areas, namely
the liberal arts, that are traditionally seen as not yielding the highest utility.
This view fails to acknowledge the values of the liberal arts that transcend
economic values, and in an attempt to escape funding pressures in the
short term, these actions will have severe consequences in the long term by
jeopardizing the place of the liberal arts in higher education.
Recent budget cuts in light of economic difficulties have made it
painfully clear that the liberal arts is often viewed as a luxury good that need
not be maintained in difficult economic times. Such cuts have occurred at
universities in the U.S. and in the U.K. In October 2010, facing funding cuts,
the State University of New York at Albany eliminated its French, Classics,
Russian, and theater programs. The school’s motto is “the world within
reach,” but this hardly seems to be exemplified by placing such subjects out
of the reach of its students (Jaschik).
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In the recent funding cuts in the U.K., it was announced that the
higher education budget would be cut by 40% over 4 years. The Department
for Business Innovation and Skills, which oversees higher education,
announced that it would ““continue to fund teaching for science, technology,
engineering and mathematics (STEM) subjects.” The STEM subjects were
identified as priority teaching areas in the Browne Review, and the decision
to keep resources focused on these areas essentially signaled an end to most,
if not all, teaching grants for humanities (Morgan). As David Carr points
out, the changes in higher education funding “have put British universities
under some pressure to seek other than public sources of revenue, and to
be more financially self-supporting. Such pressure has encouraged them to
diversify in more market competitive professional and vocational directions,
so that courses of business studies may nowadays appear more economically
attractive and viable than courses in ancient history or philosophy” (6).
These education funding cuts have had drastic effects for students,
who are now also faced with difficult choices about which type of education
they can afford to pursue. The government is allowing universities in
England to charge up to £9,000 per year for undergraduate courses, raising
the cap from its 2011/12 level of £3,375. (BBC). Although there is a graduated
payback system for student loans where students pay back 9% of their
income above a threshold (which was raised from £15,000 to £21,000), these
increased fees, along with the fact that many universities are being forced
to make difficult budgeting decisions that often put the very existence of
humanities departments in doubt, will likely affect the number of students
who pursue liberal arts degrees. The same situation will arise in the U.S.
if public universities continue to defund the humanities: soon degrees like
Classical Studies may become accessible only to those students who gain
admission to (and have the means to pay for) selective liberal arts colleges or
private universities with large endowments.
When a government makes funding decisions based on prioritizing
which degrees are more economically necessary or productive, it sends a
clear message about the value of the liberal arts. Universities are forced to
make difficult funding decisions and may focus more of their resources on
majors that are traditionally seen as more “useful.” In turn, the actions of
the government and the universities sends the message to students that the
value of education lies in how closely it can be connected to future earning
potential and overall economic productivity of a country. As seen from the
literature discussed earlier, appealing to the idea that the humanities are
necessary for democratic citizenship might place them on more solid footing.
However, even grounding the need for the study of liberal arts in its utility
for creating good democratic citizens falls short of the ideal defense by failing
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to establish and defend its inherent value.
Roche acknowledges that “one factor working against the elevation
of intrinsic value is the overriding competition principle that rules our age.”
He goes on to say that, in the context of his work as Dean at Notre Dame,
he took the view that “there are some departments that must be supported
even if they do not bring in sufficient numbers of students or dollars. There
are some values for which we need to sacrifice our competition principle,
for it, too, is after all only a means to greatness, and we must be watchful for
victims along the way” (43). By not acknowledging the inherent value of the
liberal arts, societies risk the possibility that they might be sacrificed in the
competition between universities. After all, schools with tight budgets might
come to the conclusion that if their students will obtain sufficient citizenship
education at an earlier point in their schooling or by virtue of participating
in the democratic process as Rawls suggests, there is no need for them to
allocate precious funding to liberal arts disciplines.
Some might question whether it is relevant, given the wide range
of ideas on the subject, that a society supports the humanities for one
particular reason over another. After all, some might claim that as long as
the humanities have a place and support structure in a society, the basis for
that recognition need not be examined in great detail. However, the context
of the current economic and political climate shows the opposite to be the
case. When the humanities are supported for instrumental reasons, such
as a justification that they can lead to economic prosperity by fostering a
certain type of thinking or that they lead to political stability by creating an
informed citizenry, their existence is in fact very fragile. If these instrumental
reasons cease to exist and there is no inherent basis for the existence of liberal
arts education, then it will be the first area to be marginalized in policy and
funding debates.
Place of Liberal Arts
I will argue that current philosophical and political arguments that
center on ensuring access to higher education are not sufficient to achieve the
goal of giving all citizens access to the inherent benefits of the liberal arts: in
order to ensure access to liberal arts education, efforts must begin at the level
of early childhood education and continue throughout subsequent stages.
Although much of the literature focuses on the place of the liberal arts in
higher education, the inherent value of the liberal arts is by no means limited
to university students. In fact, it would be extremely harmful to exclude it
as a consideration from earlier education. Ensuring the place of the liberal
arts in higher education, while undoubtedly critical, is not by itself sufficient.
Many people may not pursue higher education, and if the humanities
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remain solely the domain of colleges and universities, a large portion of
the population will likely not fully benefit from their inherent value. For
example, the college-going rate in many American cities, particularly large
urban ones, is very low. In Philadelphia, the college-going rate for graduating
high school seniors hovers around 25 percent. The U.K. faces a similar issue:
according to a 2009 study by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development, 25% of adults in the U.K. ages 25-34 have not completed upper
secondary education (“Education at a Glance”). Thus, ensuring a place for
the humanities, but only doing so in the area of higher education, will fail
to reach a large portion of the population. High school graduates are no
less human than people with doctoral degrees, and no less deserving of the
inherent good of the humanities.
Martha Nussbaum acknowledges that grade schools do not play
the only role in a child’s development, since much of their character may
be shaped by their life within their families. However, she says that schools
“can either reinforce or undermine the achievements of the family, good
and bad….What they provide, through their curricular content and their
pedagogy, can greatly affect the developing child’s mind” (51). For example,
one of the things she says a surrounding culture, as partially provided by the
school’s education, can do is “teach children to see new immigrant groups,
or foreigners, as a faceless mass that threatens their hegemony-or it can
teach the perception of the members of these groups as individuals equal
to themselves, sharing common rights and responsibilities” (51). Although
this is something that certainly has value for a democratic society, it also
has inherent value by virtue of broadening children’s view of the world
and reinforcing their recognition of a common humanity. Supporting this
inherent value, even in grade school education, is critical to ensuring that the
benefits of a liberal arts education are not solely limited to college students.
Advocating for a commitment to liberal arts education in grade
school may seem like a stringent requirement. However, given the fact
that the benefits of a liberal arts education are relevant even at a young age
and some students may not otherwise have access to the humanities, it is
necessary. In the era of No Child Left Behind, with its focus on continual
improvement of standardized test results, discussing grade school education
in terms of inherent goods may seem to imagine an improbable scenario. As
Roche would say, I am imagining the world not as it is, but as how I believe
it should be. This is a rigorous approach to the place of the humanities in
society, but given the inherent good of a liberal arts education, it is not an
unreasonable one.
The inherent benefits of the liberal arts for the soul, our view of
the world, and innate creativity apply regardless of age. I believe that the
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decision to prioritize a liberal arts education will provide these inherent
benefits during grade school education, and because of this a society should
also maintain a commitment to the inherent value of liberal arts for students
before they reach university. As mentioned from Nussbaum’s argument
earlier, this inclusion does not have to be at the expense of science education
or other disciplines. Nor does it have to come at the expense of results on
standardized tests: while it is debatable whether or not allowing children to
holistically engage with material will lead to results as rapidly as intensive
drilling in testing techniques, it can be argued that it will support their
long-term educational development in a way that will both improve their
performance at skills the tests aim to measure while allowing them the
inherent value that an instrumental education strips away.
If people have benefited from a liberal arts education since a very
young age, they will be able to engage with the world around them on a
deeper level. They will be able to appreciate works of art, pieces of music,
and literary texts. By doing so, this will create a climate that appreciates and
supports these pursuits. In turn, the adults that continue to see the world
“not as it is but as it should be” will recognize the inherent value of liberal
arts and ensure its place for future generations. Much like the prisoners from
Socrates’ allegory of the cave, adults with liberal arts educations should not
confine themselves solely to a cerebral existence but should work to ensure
that others have access to humanities education from an early age.
Conclusion
The liberal arts face many threats in the current economic and
political climate. Funding cuts at the university level have made these threats
clearer than ever. Although the liberal arts can be argued for in terms of their
value for creating a strong national economy or fostering characteristics
necessary for good democratic citizens, I believe they also have an inherent
value that must be acknowledged. This inherent value lies in their benefit
to our souls, the way we view the world, and our innate creativity. Rather
than being a paternalistic view that violates liberal neutrality, I believe this
argument is defensible from an egalitarian point of view by virtue of the
fact that it allows for the existence of more options in society. The inherent
benefit of the liberal arts should be recognized and supported by the state at
all educational stages. The current economic and political climate has made
it clear that any less stringent support can jeopardize the permanent place
of the liberal arts in society. If we deny the liberal arts this honor, we are
denying a part of what makes us human.
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